Corporate
Investment Grade Corporate Bonds
BBB−/Baa3 or higher
Debt issued by corporations rated BBB−/Baa3 or higher — the threshold that determines eligibility for many institutional mandates (pension funds, insurers) restricted to investment-grade holdings only.
IssuerIG-rated corporations
Tenor2 – 30y
CouponFixed, semi-annual
SettlementT+1 · DTC · 30/360
Structure & Mechanics
Typically issued via a syndicated bookbuild led by investment banks, priced at a spread over the equivalent-maturity Treasury. Day count is usually 30/360, distinct from Treasuries' Actual/Actual.
Risk Profile
Meaningfully higher credit risk than sovereign debt, but materially lower historical default rates than high yield — cumulative default rates in the low single digits over 5–10 years for BBB credits.
Real-world exampleA downgrade from BBB− to BB+ creates a "fallen angel," often forcing IG-only holders to sell regardless of their own credit view — a technical, not fundamental, source of price pressure.
Corporate
High-Yield ("Junk") Bonds
BB+/Ba1 or lower
Corporate debt rated below investment grade, compensating investors for materially higher default risk with a meaningfully higher coupon/spread over Treasuries.
IssuerSub-IG corporations
Tenor5 – 10y typical
CouponFixed, wide spread
SettlementT+1 · DTC · 30/360
Structure & Mechanics
Often carries stronger covenant protections and call-protection/change-of-control put structures than IG debt, given the higher risk; frequently funds leveraged buyouts or refinances existing debt.
Risk Profile
Materially higher, more variable default risk — cumulative 10-year default rates for CCC and below can run into the double digits — and higher sensitivity to the broader credit cycle.
Real-world exampleA wave of exchange offers and consent solicitations (see Part I of this study set) is the typical operational path a distressed high-yield issuer takes to restructure outside formal bankruptcy.
Corporate
Convertible Bonds
Bond + Equity Option
A hybrid — a bond paying a below-market fixed coupon, but giving the holder the right to convert into a pre-set number of the issuer's common shares, letting the issuer borrow more cheaply in exchange for offering equity upside.
IssuerOften growth/tech corporates
Tenor3 – 7y typical
CouponLow, plus equity upside
SettlementT+1 · DTC
Structure & Mechanics
Conversion price is set at issuance, usually at a premium to the current share price. The bond behaves like ordinary debt when the share price is well below the conversion price, and increasingly like equity as it rallies past it.
Risk Profile
Issuer credit risk plus genuine equity-linked volatility — its price can move more than a comparable non-convertible bond, particularly for lower-rated issuers.
Real-world exampleHigh-growth technology companies have used convertible notes extensively to raise capital at a lower coupon than a straight bond, betting that share appreciation — not cash repayment — becomes the eventual outcome.
Corporate
Floating Rate Notes (FRNs)
SOFR / €STR / SONIA + Spread
A bond whose coupon resets periodically (commonly quarterly) to a reference rate plus a fixed spread — historically LIBOR-based, now predominantly SOFR (US), €STR (EU), or SONIA (UK)-based post the 2021+ benchmark transition.
IssuerCorporates, banks, sovereigns
Tenor2 – 10y
CouponReference rate + spread, resets quarterly
SettlementT+1 · DTC
Structure & Mechanics
Because the coupon resets with the market, price stays much closer to par than a fixed-rate bond's — very low duration, since a rate move is absorbed by the next reset rather than the price.
Risk Profile
Minimal interest-rate risk relative to a fixed-rate bond of the same maturity; credit risk is unchanged and driven by the issuer, not the floating structure.
Real-world exampleThe 2021–2023 industry-wide LIBOR-to-SOFR transition required re-papering the reset mechanics of a huge stock of legacy FRNs — a landmark operational project across fixed income desks.
Corporate / Government
Zero-Coupon Bonds & STRIPS
No Periodic Coupon
A bond with no periodic coupon at all, sold at a deep discount, with the entire return delivered as the gap between purchase price and par at maturity. Treasury STRIPS split an ordinary coupon-paying Treasury into individual coupon and principal cash flows, each traded separately as its own zero.
IssuerCorporates or Treasury (STRIPS)
TenorVaries
CouponNone — deep discount
SettlementT+1
Structure & Mechanics
Priced purely as the present value of a single future cash flow — no coupon reinvestment risk exists, since there's nothing to reinvest until maturity.
Risk Profile
Highest duration/rate sensitivity of any structure for a given maturity, since 100% of cash flow arrives at one point far in the future — small yield changes produce large price swings.
Real-world exampleZero-coupon Treasury STRIPS are commonly used to fund a known future liability with precision — a classic pension-liability-matching or education-funding use case.
Corporate
Perpetual Bonds
No Fixed Maturity
A bond with no stated maturity date — the issuer pays coupons indefinitely (subject to any embedded call option) rather than ever repaying principal on a fixed schedule.
IssuerCorporates, banks
TenorNone — perpetual
CouponFixed or fixed-to-floating
SettlementT+1/T+2
Structure & Mechanics
Almost always callable after an initial period (e.g., 5 or 10 years); market convention typically prices and trades to the expected call date rather than a theoretical infinite maturity, though the issuer isn't obligated to call.
Risk Profile
Meaningful extension risk — if the issuer doesn't call at the expected date (often because refinancing is unfavourable), the holder is left with a much longer-duration instrument than priced in, sometimes at a below-market coupon.
Real-world examplePerpetual structures are common in bank capital instruments (Subordinated Debt and CoCo bonds below), where regulators favour permanent, loss-absorbing capital over fixed-repayment debt.
Corporate
Medium-Term Notes (MTNs)
Programme Issuance
Debt issued continuously off a shelf programme rather than as a single large syndicated deal — letting an issuer tailor maturity, currency, and coupon structure to specific investor demand, issuing smaller, more frequent tranches.
IssuerCorporates, banks
Tenor1 – 10y, flexible
CouponFixed, floating, or structured
SettlementT+1/T+2
Structure & Mechanics
Issued under a standing MTN programme with legal documentation pre-agreed, letting a bank match investor demand to issuer supply quickly rather than running a full new syndication for every issuance.
Risk Profile
Same fundamental credit risk as the issuer's other debt; operationally, the sheer variety of terms across a large programme (dozens or hundreds of tranches) makes accurate per-tranche static data essential.
Real-world exampleMTN programmes are a core funding tool for banks and large corporates wanting continuous, flexible market access without launching a new benchmark deal every time.
Corporate
Covered Bonds
Dual Recourse
Debt issued by a bank and secured by a ring-fenced pool of high-quality assets (typically mortgages or public-sector loans) remaining on the issuer's balance sheet — giving bondholders a dual claim: against the bank generally, and the specific collateral pool if the bank defaults.
IssuerBanks (primarily European)
Tenor2 – 10y typical
CouponFixed
SettlementT+2 · Euroclear/Clearstream
Structure & Mechanics
The collateral pool is dynamically managed — if any loan defaults or prepays, the issuer must replace it to maintain pool quality, unlike a securitization where the pool is static once issued.
Risk Profile
Very low credit risk relative to the issuing bank's ordinary senior debt given dual recourse — strong European issuers' covered bonds often carry ratings above the bank's own senior unsecured rating.
Real-world exampleCovered bonds are a dominant bank funding tool in Germany, the Nordics, and France — historically far less common in the US, which relies more on securitization for similar needs.
Bank Capital
Subordinated Debt (Tier 2)
Junior to Senior Debt
Debt ranking below an issuer's senior unsecured debt in the repayment waterfall — subordinated bondholders are repaid only after senior creditors are made whole, compensated for that extra risk with a higher coupon.
IssuerCorporates, banks
Tenor10y+ typical
CouponFixed, higher than senior
SettlementT+1/T+2
Structure & Mechanics
For banks specifically, qualifying subordinated debt counts as Tier 2 regulatory capital under Basel III — a loss-absorbing layer sitting between senior debt and the more junior AT1/CoCo instruments below.
Risk Profile
Materially higher loss-given-default than senior debt from the same issuer, since recovery comes only after senior claims are satisfied in full.
Real-world exampleIn almost every corporate bankruptcy or bank resolution, subordinated bondholders recover a smaller percentage of face value than senior bondholders of the identical issuer.
Bank Capital
Contingent Convertible Bonds (CoCo / AT1)
Basel III AT1
A perpetual, deeply subordinated bank capital instrument designed to automatically convert to equity — or be written down entirely — if the issuing bank's capital ratio falls below a pre-set trigger, absorbing losses to help avoid a taxpayer-funded bailout. The most loss-absorbing form of debt-like bank capital under Basel III.
IssuerBanks
TenorPerpetual, callable
CouponHigh, fully discretionary
SettlementT+1/T+2
Structure & Mechanics
The issuer has full discretion to cancel the coupon at any time without triggering a default — a feature ordinary bonds don't have — making AT1 coupons economically closer to a discretionary dividend than a contractual obligation.
Risk Profile
The highest-risk instrument in this guide. Beyond ordinary credit and extension risk, CoCo holders can be wiped out or diluted before equity holders in some structures — an outcome long assumed reversed (equity absorbs losses first) that did not hold in every real case.
Real-world exampleIn March 2023, Swiss regulator FINMA ordered Credit Suisse's AT1 bonds — around CHF 16 billion — written down to zero as part of its emergency takeover by UBS, even as Credit Suisse shareholders retained some value. The largest loss ever imposed on the global AT1 market, and the subject of years of subsequent litigation.